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 II.-65 
“GOOD FAITH” TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
APPROACH TO THE TEA ROSE-RECTANUS 
DOCTRINE 
Abstract: In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 
Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. that the “good faith” element of the 
Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, a common-law affirmative defense to trademark in-
fringement, requires the junior user to have used the trademark without knowledge 
of the senior user’s prior use of the mark. This ruling echoed the Seventh Circuit’s 
similar finding in 1982 in Money Store v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., and the Eighth 
Circuit’s finding in 2001 in National Association for Healthcare Communications, 
Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc. The Ninth Circuit decision 
deepened the split with the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, which ruled in 1991 and 2001, 
respectively, that knowledge is not dispositive of bad faith, but is merely one factor 
to consider in a good faith inquiry. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly decided that knowledge of a senior user’s prior use of a mark destroys the 
good faith defense under the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
The policy goals of goodwill protection and trade diversion prevention 
underscore trademark law.1 On the federal level, the Lanham Act serves these 
goals by creating a federal principal register and allowing a trademark owner 
to establish trademark rights throughout the nation.2 Unregistered marks, how-
ever, are protected only at common law, and only under certain circumstances.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 TIM W. DORNIS, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CONFLICTS 77 (2017) (explaining 
that goodwill and trade diversion are the two crucial elements of trademark protection). “Goodwill” is 
the “positive reputation” that a business creates around its brand, a product of the owner’s labor. 38 
AM. JUR. 2D Good Will § 1 (2019). Trademarks symbolize the business’s goodwill. J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:2 (5th ed. 2018). Trade 
diversion occurs when a business applies another’s trademark to their own products, misrepresenting 
their products to be that of the original trademark user and depriving that user of profits they would 
have made if the trademark infringer had not misled the consumer into buying their products. Hanover 
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). 
 2 Selecting and Registering a Trademark, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/
TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/StateTrademarkRegistrationsUSFactSheet.aspx [https://perma.cc/
C4QB-DHZW]; see 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (codifying the application process for registration of a 
trademark on the federal principal register). 
 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:1; see Hanover, 240 U.S. at 410–11 (noting that because neither 
party had a federally registered trademark, the Court would decide the case based on common law 
principles). 
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Under the common law Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, a junior user may estab-
lish priority over a senior user’s right to a mark in a remote area if the mark is 
used in good faith.4 
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance in determining what con-
stitutes “good faith” for purposes of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, which has 
led to conflict within the courts.5 In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit decided in Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. 
that when two parties use a similar mark, the junior user retains common law 
trademark rights so long as it used the mark in a remote area, in good faith, and 
without knowledge of the senior user’s prior use of the mark.6 This decision 
brought the Ninth Circuit on par with both the Seventh and Eighth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, which had previously ruled that knowledge of the senior 
user’s prior use of the mark destroys the doctrine’s good faith defense.7 In con-
trast, in the Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the junior user’s 
knowledge that the senior user used the mark does not necessarily destroy 
good faith, unless the junior user intended to benefit from the senior user’s 
goodwill and reputation.8 
Part I of this Comment discusses the foundations of trademark rights, the 
Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, and the facts and procedural history of Stone 
Creek.9 Part II of this Comment explains the circuit split and the different posi-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See U.S. Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 104 (1918) (holding that, because 
the junior user Rectanus used the “Rex” mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior us-
er’s use of the mark, and because Rectanus had already built up goodwill in that specific market, the 
senior user could not prevent Rectanus from continuing to use the mark in that market); Hanover, 240 
U.S. at 419 (holding that, because the junior user used the “Tea Rose” mark in good faith and without 
knowledge of the senior user’s use of the mark in a different market, the senior user could not assert 
trademark infringement in the junior user’s market). The senior user is the first entity, either an indi-
vidual or a business, to use a certain mark. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:1. The junior user is the 
entity that adopted the mark after the mark was in use. Id. 
 5 See Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 103 (stating without elaboration that Rectanus, the junior user, used 
the “Rex” mark “in good faith, and without notice of prior use by others”); Hanover, 240 U.S. at 410 
(stating without elaboration that the junior user, Hanover, used the mark “in good faith without 
knowledge or notice”);  infra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 6 Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. (Stone Creek IV), 875 F.3d 426, 439 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
 7 See, e.g., Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 439 (holding that the junior user retains common law 
trademark rights only if it used the mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior user’s use 
of the mark); Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 
257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant adopted the mark in good faith, without 
knowledge of the senior user’s prior use); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 675 
(7th Cir. 1982) (explaining that to use a mark in good faith, the junior user must not have had 
knowledge of another’s use of the mark). 
 8 See, e.g., C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that the Fifth Circuit case precedent supports knowledge as only one factor in determining good faith); 
GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that “mere knowledge” is not 
enough to determine bad faith). 
 9 See infra notes 12–45 and accompanying text. 
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tions courts have taken in analyzing “good faith.”10 Part III of this Comment 
analyzes each side’s policy implications and concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis of the “good faith” element in Stone Creek is in line with the policy 
goals of trademark law and the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine.11 
I. THE FACTS AND HISTORY OF STONE CREEK AND THE  
TEA ROSE-RECTANUS DOCTRINE 
Section A of this Part discusses the foundations of trademark rights and 
the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine.12 Section B of this Part develops the facts of 
Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc.13 Section C of this Part discuss-
es the procedural history of Stone Creek, from its initiation to the Supreme 
Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari.14 
A. The Tea Rose-Rectanus Doctrine 
At common law, a trademark owner only acquires protection of a mark 
when the mark is actually used in commerce.15 Courts determine whether 
trademark infringement occurred by analyzing whether there is a “likelihood 
of confusion” between a junior and senior user’s marks.16 When a court deter-
mines that a likelihood of confusion exists, the first party to use the mark in 
commerce generally has the superior trademark right and may enjoin other 
parties within the same territorial area from using the mark.17 In contrast, the 
Supreme Court established in the landmark cases of Hanover Star Milling Co. 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 48–88 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–24 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 31–45 and accompanying text. 
 15 Hanover, 240 U.S. at 413; see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 16:1 (explaining that trademark 
ownership priority goes to the first party to use the mark). 
 16 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1. State courts generally look to federal case precedent to test 
for trademark infringement. Id. § 23:1.50. State and federal laws protect against trademark confusion 
because the purpose of a trademark is for a business to designate itself as the producer of a good or 
service. Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1639, 1648–49 (2016). 
 17 Hanover, 240 U.S. at 415. The “remote” territorial area where senior users may enjoin junior 
users from using the mark is the geographic area where there is a likelihood of confusion between the 
trademarks of the junior and senior user. William J. Gross, Note, The Territorial Scope of Trademark 
Rights, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1075, 1078 (1990). Courts refer to three “zones of protection” when 
determining the territorial scope of trademark protection: zones of actual market penetration, zones of 
reputation, and zones of natural expansion. Id. In the zone of actual market penetration, the senior user 
has built up popularity surrounding the product or brand such that the mark is associated with the 
senior user’s business, causing a likelihood of confusion with a junior user’s use of the mark. Id. In 
the zone of reputation, the trademark is known through advertising or word-of-mouth such that there 
is still a likelihood of confusion if another party uses the mark. Id. In the zone of natural expansion, 
the senior user has not developed any goodwill surrounding the mark but may eventually do so by 
expanding its business within the area. Id. 
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v. Metcalf (“Tea Rose”) in 1916 and United States Drug Co. v. Theodore Rec-
tanus Co. (“Rectanus”) in 1918 that when two similar trademarks are used in 
remote markets, multiple users may possess a valid right to use the mark.18 
Under this Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, if a junior user of a trademark uses the 
mark in good faith in a remote area where it is not already in use, a senior user 
cannot enjoin the junior user from using the same or similar trademark in that 
area.19 As the doctrine is an affirmative defense to an infringement claim, a 
defendant must prove both elements of “good faith” and “remoteness.”20 
Conversely, the Lanham Act allows a trademark owner to establish 
trademark rights throughout the entire nation by registering it with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).21 The Act preserves junior 
users’ common law rights if they used the mark in good faith and in a remote 
area prior to the mark’s registration, but statutory constructive notice prevents 
a good faith defense for junior users who use the mark after registration.22 If a 
trademark owner only has rights issued through a state’s trademark office, they 
only hold rights within that specific state.23 Although a trademark owner using 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 100 (stating that two different users may use the same trademark 
simultaneously in different markets); Hanover, 240 U.S. at 416 (explaining that a senior user cannot 
monopolize markets where it has not used the mark and the mark is associated with a junior user’s 
products). In 1916, in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the Supreme Court held that the junior 
user, Hanover Star Milling, coincidentally began selling “Tea Rose” flour without knowing of the 
senior user’s, Allen & Wheeler Co.’s, use of the name many years after the senior user began selling it 
in 1872. Hanover, 240 U.S. at 407–08. Hanover’s use of the mark never overlapped with the same 
geographic area as Allen & Wheeler Co. Id. at 408–09. Allen & Wheeler argued that senior ownership 
of the mark entitled it to prevent use of the mark anywhere in the nation. Id. at 407. The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, holding that because Hanover used the mark in good faith, without 
knowledge of Allen & Wheeler Co.’s use of the mark, in a remote area, it was entitled to use the mark. 
Id. at 419. In the Supreme Court’s decision in 1918, in United States Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus 
Co., Ellen Regis began selling drugs marked with its trademark, “Rex,” in New England in 1877, and 
eventually sold the business with all trademark rights to United Drug Co. in 1911. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 
at 94. Shortly thereafter, the junior user, Theodore Rectanus, began selling drugs with a similar mark 
in 1883 in Kentucky. Id. The Supreme Court held that the senior user, United Drug Co., could not 
prevent Rectanus from using the mark in in good faith in Kentucky because common law trademark 
rights did not extend into zones of natural expansion. Id. at 103; see Gross, supra note 17, at 1083 
(explaining that zones of natural expansion are regions in which the senior user has not developed any 
goodwill surrounding the mark). 
 19 Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 104; Hanover, 240 U.S. at 419; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:2. 
 20 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:4; Gross, supra note 17, at 1083; see supra note 17 and ac-
companying text (explaining “remoteness”); infra notes 49–88 and accompanying text (explaining 
“good faith”). 
 21 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 2; see 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (stating that registration of a 
trademark on the federal principal register is prima facie evidence of the registered party’s exclusive 
right to use the mark). 
 22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1115(b)(5)–(6). Constructive notice is “notice presumed by law to have 
been acquired by a person and thus imputed by that person.” Notice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARy 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 23 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 2. Some state laws allow remedies in addition to those 
afforded by the Lanham Act. Id. 
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the trademark only within a single state may register the trademark in that 
state, the USPTO reserves federal registration for marks used in interstate, ter-
ritorial, and international commerce.24 
B. Stone Creek’s Factual Background 
In 1992, Stone Creek, Inc., an Arizona-based furniture manufacturer and 
seller, registered the trademark “STONE CREEK” with the Arizona state regis-
ter, but not with the USPTO.25 In 2003, Stone Creek entered into an agreement 
with Omnia, a California-based leather furniture manufacturer, wherein Omnia 
manufactured and distributed leather furniture for Stone Creek and affixed the 
furniture with the STONE CREEK mark.26 In 2008, Omnia entered into a 
similar agreement with Bon-Ton wherein Omnia supplied leather furniture to 
Bon-Ton, who sold and delivered the furniture to consumers in the Midwest.27 
Omnia manufactured the furniture for Bon-Ton’s private label but affixed the 
STONE CREEK mark, copied directly from Stone Creek’s marketing materi-
als, on the furniture without Stone Creek’s permission.28 Bon-Ton and Stone 
Creek did not actively sell furniture in the same geographic areas; Bon-Ton’s 
Omnia products with the STONE CREEK mark reached customers in the 
Midwest, whereas Stone Creek sold primarily in Arizona.29 In 2013, after 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. The scope of the Lanham Act is “commerce within the control of Congress.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127. Use of a mark within a single state may still qualify for federal registration under the Lanham 
Act if the use of the mark “would, taken in the aggregate, have a direct effect on interstate commerce” 
and fall under Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. Commerce That May Be Lawfully Regulated by 
Congress, TRADEMARK MANUAL EXAMINING PROC. § 901.03 (Oct. 2018); see U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power to regular certain types of commerce); Christian Faith 
Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 992–93 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that a church’s 
intrastate sale of hats to an out-of-state resident fell under Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and 
qualified the mark for federal trademark registration). Marks that are not approved for placement on 
the federal principal register may still qualify for the supplemental register, which affords some rights 
to the user but does not place others on constructive notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (listing the provi-
sions of the statute applicable to supplemental registrations). 
 25 Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 430; Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. (Stone Creek 
I), 2014 WL 11514487, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2014). 
 26 Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *1. The STONE CREEK mark consists of the words 
“Stone Creek” circled in a red oval. Id. 
 27 Id. Bon-Ton refused to sell under the Omnia name, and instead opted to sell under the more 
American-sounding “Stone Creek.” Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 430. Bon-Ton’s products with the 
STONE CREEK mark reached customers specifically in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 28 Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *1. 
 29 Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 430. Bon-Ton sold its products in Stone Creek’s zone of reputa-
tion; Stone Creek’s online and print advertisements reached the Midwest, and a very small fraction of 
Stone’s Creek’s total sales were from customers in the Midwest. See id. at 434 (describing Stone 
Creek’s advertising methods and stating that $610,384 of more than $200,000,000 of Stone Creek’s 
total sales occurred in the Midwest); Gross, supra note 17, at 1072 (explaining that in the zone of 
reputation, the trademark is known through advertising so that a likelihood of confusion exists if an-
other party uses the mark). 
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learning of Bon-Ton’s use of its mark, Stone Creek filed a trademark infringe-
ment suit against Omnia in the District of Arizona.30 
C. Procedural History 
In 2014, the district court considered whether Omnia acquired common 
law trademark rights to the STONE CREEK mark in the Midwest under the 
Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine.31 On a motion for summary judgment, the court 
rejected the defense, joining the majority of jurisdictions in holding that the 
junior user’s knowledge of the senior’s use of the trademark defeats the doc-
trine’s “good faith” element.32 The court considered but rejected the alternative 
view that the junior user’s knowledge is strong evidence of bad faith but does 
not automatically prevent a finding of good faith.33 
The court reasoned that if the Lanham Act dictates that statutory construc-
tive notice prevents a good faith defense for junior users who use the mark af-
ter registration, then a junior user’s actual knowledge of the senior user’s prior 
use of the mark, without federal registration, requires the same outcome.34 Be-
cause Omnia adopted the mark despite knowing of Stone Creek’s prior use, 
Omnia did not use the mark in good faith and did not acquire the right under 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *2. Omnia moved for summary judgment on all of the 
alleged claims, including trademark infringement, contract, and tort claims. Id. Stone Creek moved for 
partial summary judgment on its claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition. Id. 
 31 Id. at *4. 
 32 Id. at *4–5. The district court specifically agreed with Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, 
Inc., a 1978 case from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which stated that, 
if Lanham Act constructive notice defeats good faith, then actual knowledge should also destroy good 
faith in cases with unregistered trademarks. Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *4–5; see Johanna 
Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp 866, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a junior user’s 
actual knowledge of a senior user’s use of a mark destroys good faith). 
 33 Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *4–5 (rejecting the minority view that the focus of a 
good faith inquiry should be whether the junior user intended to benefit from the senior user’s good-
will). Specifically, the district court considered the arguments in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
opinion in 2001 in C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc. and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
opinion in 1990 in GTE Corp. v. Williams. See Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *4–5 (referenc-
ing the minority view that the junior user’s knowledge of the senior user’s prior use of a mark does 
not automatically preclude a finding of good faith); C.P. Interests, 238 F.3d at 700 (holding that 
“mere knowledge” is not enough to determine bad faith; rather, the focus of a good faith inquiry 
should be whether the junior user intended to benefit off of the senior user’s goodwill); GTE Corp., 
904 F.2d at 541 (holding that Fifth Circuit precedent required knowledge of prior use to be only one 
factor in determining good faith); infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
 34 Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *5; see 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (codifying federal registration 
as constructive notice). The district court did not elaborate on its reasoning. See Stone Creek I, 2014 
WL 11514487, at *5 (deciding, without elaboration, that, similar to the Lanham Act, a junior user’s 
knowledge of a senior’s prior use of a mark precludes a finding of good faith at common law). 
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common law to use the mark in the Midwest.35 Thus, Stone Creek retained the 
exclusive right to use the mark in Omnia’s market.36 
Despite holding that Omnia did not have common law rights to use the 
mark, the court denied Stone Creek’s motion for summary judgment because it 
was unwilling to decide whether there was a likelihood of confusion between 
the two marks.37 In 2015, Stone Creek once again moved for partial summary 
judgment seeking a disgorgement of Omnia’s revenue, which the court de-
nied.38 After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Omnia’s favor, finding no 
liability on its part because the evidence available did not show a likelihood of 
confusion between Omnia and Stone Creek’s use of the mark.39 
Stone Creek appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit.40 
On appeal, Omnia argued that the Ninth Circuit should affirm the district 
court’s holding of no liability because Omnia’s use of the mark did not cause a 
likelihood of confusion, or, alternatively, on the basis that Omnia established 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Stone Creek I, 2014 WL 11514487, at *5 
 36 Id. at *5 (establishing Stone Creek’s ownership of the mark). 
 37 Id. at *8. To satisfy the elements of its trademark infringement claim, Stone Creek had to show 
that: (1) it owned a valid mark; (2) Omnia used Stone Creek’s mark without its consent; and (3) Om-
nia’s unauthorized use of the mark was likely to cause confusion. Id. at *2. The likelihood of confu-
sion prong is the main element of a trademark infringement claim. Id. at *5. The Ninth Circuit used an 
eight-factor test to determine the likelihood of confusion: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the relat-
edness of the goods; (3) the marketing channels used; (4) the strength of the mark; (5) defendant's 
intent in selecting the mark; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the likelihood of expansion into 
other markets; and (8) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers. Id. Due to genuine 
factual disputes regarding whether Stone Creek was likely to expand into other markets, consumer 
recognition of the mark, evidence of actual confusion, and the marketing channels that Stone Creek 
used, the district court was unwilling to decide at the summary judgment stage that there was a likeli-
hood of confusion between the marks. Id. Consequently, the court granted partial summary judgment 
in Stone Creek’s favor regarding its exclusive right to use the mark in Omnia’s market and Omnia’s 
lack of permission to use the mark, but denied summary judgment for both parties on the issue of 
Omnia’s ultimate liability. Id. 
 38 See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. (Stone Creek II), 2015 WL 11117079, at *5 
(D. Ariz. July 10, 2014) (denying Stone Creek’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking dis-
gorgement of Omnia’s revenue). The court could not award profits to Stone Creek because, to deter-
mine whether Omnia willfully infringed on the mark, it needed first to decide that Omnia did in fact 
infringe on Stone Creek’s trademark, which it had yet to do. Id. Because Stone Creek “unreasonably 
multiplied the proceedings of the case,” and because Stone Creek’s attorneys knowingly or recklessly 
raised frivolous arguments, the court sanctioned Stone Creek’s attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
Stone Creek II, 2015 WL 11117079, at *5; see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (imposing economic sanc-
tions on attorneys who “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply court proceedings); Stone Creek, Inc. 
v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 2016 WL 492629, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2016) (granting in part Om-
nia’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees for fees it incurred in preparing to defend itself against Stone 
Creek’s meritless claims for actual damages). 
 39 Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 2015 WL 6865704 (Stone Creek III), at *7 (D. 
Ariz. Nov. 9, 2015). The district court applied the Ninth Circuit’s eight-factor test to determine the 
likelihood of confusion and found that the factors weighed in Omnia’s favor. See id. at *6 (finding 
that “territorial isolation prevented the likelihood of confusion”). 
 40 Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 428. 
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common-law rights to use the STONE CREEK mark under the Tea Rose-
Rectanus doctrine.41 The court reversed the district court’s finding that there was 
no likelihood of consumer confusion, holding Omnia liable for infringement of 
the STONE CREEK mark.42 The Ninth Circuit also rejected Omnia’s Tea Rose-
Rectanus defense, agreeing with the district court that Omnia’s knowledge of 
Stone Creek’s prior use of the mark destroyed its good faith element.43 
On November 13, 2017, Omnia filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court.44 The Court denied the petition on May 14, 2018.45 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK 
Section A of this Part discusses how the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf (“Tea Rose”) in 1916 and United States 
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co. (“Rectanus”) in 1918 allow for multiple 
interpretations of the “good faith” element of the Tea Rose-Rectanus doc-
trine.46 Section B compares the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals’ 
“no knowledge” approach to good faith with the Tenth and Fifth Circuit Courts 
of Appeals’ “something more” approach.47 Section C discusses the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ interpretation of “good faith” in 2015 in Stone Creek, 
Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc.48 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 429. 
 42 Id. at 444. 
 43 Id. at 439. The Ninth Circuit also remanded the earlier disgorgement of profits case, agreeing 
that willfulness is a required condition of disgorgement of profits and ordering the lower court to 
determine whether Omnia possessed the necessary intent to infringe. Id.; see Stone Creek II, 2015 WL 
11117079, at *5 (holding that the court could not award damages to Stone Creek by determining 
whether Omnia willfully infringed on the mark until it determined whether Omnia infringed on the 
mark at all). Lastly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the sanctions on Stone Creek’s attorneys for bringing 
the disgorgement of profits suit, stating that their arguments were not frivolous, but upheld the sanc-
tions on the attorneys for their continued assertion of the actual damages claim. Stone Creek IV, 875 
F.3d at 428; see Stone Creek II, 2015 WL 11117079, at *5 (sanctioning Stone Creek’s attorneys for 
bringing a motion for summary judgment that “unreasonably multiplied the proceedings of the case,” 
and for knowingly or recklessly raising a frivolous argument regarding disgorgement of profits). On 
remand, the district court held that Stone Creek is not entitled to disgorgement of Omnia’s profits 
because Omnia did not willfully infringe on the trademark, but is entitled to a permanent injunction to 
prevent Omnia from infringing on the mark again. Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 
2018 WL 1784689, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2018). 
 44 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Omnia Italian Design, Inc. v. Stone Creek, Inc., 2017 WL 
5495948 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2017) (No. 17-731). 
 45 Omnia Italian Design, Inc. v. Stone Creek, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1984 (2018). 
 46 See infra notes 49–62 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 63–80 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Supreme Court’s Take on “Good Faith” 
The Supreme Court did not outline the good faith element’s requirements 
in either of its doctrinal cases.49 Neither of the junior users in Tea Rose and 
Rectanus knew of the senior user’s prior use of the mark.50 The Supreme Court 
has not provided guidance on the good faith element of the doctrine since it 
decided Rectanus in 1918.51 Federal circuit courts are thus split between 
whether knowledge of a senior user’s prior use of the mark destroys good faith 
completely, or is merely one factor to consider in a good faith analysis.52 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See United States Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103 (1918) (stating with-
out elaboration that the junior user used the mark “in good faith, and without notice of prior use by 
others.”); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 410 (1916) (stating without elaboration 
that the junior user used the mark “in good faith without knowledge or notice”). 
 50 Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 94 (noting that the junior user, Theodore Rectanus, began selling drugs 
with a similar mark as the senior user, Ellen Regis, without knowing of her use of the mark); Hanover, 
240 U.S. at 412 (noting that the junior user, Hanover Star Milling, coincidentally began selling “Tea 
Rose” flour, without knowing of Allen & Wheeler Co.’s use of the name, many years after the senior 
user began selling it in 1872). 
 51 See generally Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90 (holding that the senior user could not prevent the junior 
user from continuing to use the mark because the junior user used the mark in good faith and had 
already built up goodwill in that market); Hanover, 240 U.S. 403 (holding that the senior trademark 
user could not assert trademark infringement in the junior user’s market where the junior user used the 
mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior user’s prior use). In the eighteenth century, 
trademark rights developed based on the distinction between Courts of Equity and Courts of Law. 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:1. In Courts of Law, trademark infringement cases were based on the 
concept of fraud. Id. In Courts of Equity, cases were based on the concept of trademark as a property 
right. Id. In time, courts began to recognize rights to exclusive uses of marks, and in 1879, the Su-
preme Court’s In re Trade-Mark Cases ruling solidified the concept of trademark rights as property 
rights. DORNIS, supra note 1, at 81–83; see In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (holding 
that the right to a symbol is a property right). With this determination came a new issue: whether 
trademark protection was an absolute property right. DORNIS, supra note 1, at 91. In 1879, the Su-
preme Court held in Kidd v. Johnson that the right to use a trademark would not be limited geograph-
ically or temporally. Dornis, supra note 1, at 92; see Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 619 (1879) (ex-
plaining, in a dispute centered on the concurrent use of a whiskey trademark in New York and Cincin-
nati, that trademark rights are not limited with regard to time or place). This proved problematic as 
marketplaces expanded and trade and commerce increased because absolute trademark protection 
inhibited protection of good faith market investment and affected the public good; an unlimited 
trademark protection for one individual resulted in absolute limitation for all other individuals. DOR-
NIS, supra note 1, at 93. As the focus of trademarks began to shift from the trademark owner’s place 
of business to the market and customer base, the Supreme Court introduced the Tea Rose-Rectanus 
doctrine, effectively limiting the territorial scope of trademark rights that courts previously viewed as 
unlimited. Id. at 102. 
 52 Compare Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. (Stone Creek IV), 875 F.3d 426, 430 
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the junior user retains common law trademark rights only if it used the 
mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior user’s use of the mark), Nat’l Ass’n for 
Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the defendant adopted the mark in good faith, without knowledge of the senior 
user’s prior use), and Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 675 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that a junior user of trademark only used that mark in good faith if they did not have knowledge of the 
senior user’s use of the mark), with C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 
2001) (holding that Fifth Circuit precedent required knowledge of prior use to be only one factor in 
II.-74 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
In Tea Rose, the Court noted that the junior user used the mark in good 
faith without any knowledge of its prior use, indicating that lack of knowledge 
is necessary to establish good faith.53 Nonetheless, the Court later mentioned 
that if the junior and senior users’ markets are remote from one another, the 
issue of first use is insignificant unless the junior user adopted the mark to 
benefit from the senior user’s goodwill, or some other “design inimical to the 
interests of the senior user.”54 With this “design inimical” language, the Court 
also seemed to indicate that if the two markets are remote, the intent to benefit 
from the senior user’s goodwill or the expectation of a likelihood of confusion 
with the senior user’s mark would destroy good faith; knowledge of the mark 
alone would not be enough to do so.55 
The Court’s holding in Rectanus also did not contradict either position, as 
the Court noted that the junior user used the mark in good faith without 
knowledge of prior use, and, quoting Tea Rose’s “design inimical” language, 
further noted that there was no evidence of an ill motive.56 The Court did not 
explicitly define good faith, but held that bad faith use would be significant in 
determining the junior user’s territorial trademark rights.57 In emphasizing that 
trademark rights are meant to protect a user’s goodwill, the Court explained 
that preventing Rectanus, the junior user, from using the mark in good faith in 
a remote area after creating his own goodwill surrounding the mark, would be 
contrary to the policy goals of prioritizing first use.58 
Taken together, the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine provides lower courts with 
two primary analytical concerns that slightly conflict.59 On one side, because the 
senior user has not generated any goodwill in a remote area to protect, the junior 
user should be free to use the mark regardless of knowledge if they did not in-
tend to infringe on the trademark.60 On the other side, the Court’s emphasis on 
                                                                                                                           
determining good faith), and GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
“mere knowledge” is not enough to determine bad faith; rather, the focus of a good faith inquiry 
should be whether the junior user intended to benefit off of the senior user’s goodwill). 
 53 Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412. 
 54 Id. at 420. 
 55 See id. (“The question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant; unless . . . the second 
adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the senior user, such as to 
take the benefit of the reputation of his goods . . . .”); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:10 (explaining 
the minority view that more than just knowledge of prior use is necessary to destroy good faith). 
 56 Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 101, 103; see Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412 (explaining that, in remote mar-
kets, determining prior or first use of a mark is “legally insignificant” unless the junior user chose the 
mark “with some design inimical to the interests of the senior user . . . .”). 
 57 See Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 101 (emphasizing that Rectanus had no sinister purpose). 
 58 See id. at 100 (stating that a trademark is a means of protecting one’s goodwill). 
 59 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the extent of the circuit split). 
 60 See Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 101 (connecting the junior user’s lack of “sinister purpose” with 
good faith); Hanover, 240 U.S. at 415 (preventing the senior user from asserting trademark infringe-
ment unless the junior user used the mark “with some design inimical to the interests of the first us-
er”); infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
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the junior user’s lack of knowledge indicates that knowledge of prior use is in 
itself a lack of good faith.61 Subsequent decisions by lower courts applying this 
guidance have split in two directions differentiated by which mode of analysis 
the court prioritizes.62 
B. The Split Circuits: Strict vs. Loose Interpretation of “Good Faith” 
One of the earliest leading cases that held that knowledge of prior use de-
stroys good faith was the Seventh Circuit’s 1982 decision in Money Store v. 
Harriscorp Finance, Inc.63 The plaintiff, Money Store, first used its mark in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1972; eight months later, United Bank began 
using the same mark in Chicago.64 The Seventh Circuit decided that, because 
the plaintiff did not federally register the mark until twenty months after Unit-
ed Bank’s first use, United Bank did not have constructive knowledge of Mon-
ey Store’s use of the mark.65 Because Money Store could not provide evidence 
that United Bank had actual knowledge of its first use of the mark, the court 
found that United Bank used the mark in good faith and could enjoin Money 
Store’s use of the mark in Chicago.66 The Seventh Circuit did not elaborate on 
its rationale behind why good faith requires a lack of knowledge of the prior 
use of the mark.67 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 101, 103 (deciding that the junior user could use the mark if they 
appropriated the mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior’s prior use); Hanover, 240 
U.S. at 437 (emphasizing the importance of prior opinions that closely connect knowledge with good 
faith); infra notes 63–67, 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 62 Compare Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 430 (holding that the junior user retains common law 
trademark rights only if it used the mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior user's use 
of the mark), Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, 257 F.3d at 735 (holding that the defendant 
adopted the mark in good faith if they used the mark without knowledge of the senior user’s prior 
use), and Money Store, 689 F.2d at 675 (holding that knowledge of the mark’s use prevents a junior 
user from using it in good faith), with C.P. Interests, 238 F.3d at 700 (holding that knowledge is only 
one factor in determining good faith), and GTE Corp, 904 F.2d at 541 (holding that “mere 
knowledge” is not enough to determine bad faith). 
 63 See Money Store, 689 F.2d at 675 (explaining that a junior user only used the mark in good 
faith if they did not know that someone else already used the mark to distinguish their business). 
 64 Id. United Bank assigned the mark to the defendant, Harriscorp, in 1974. Id. at 669. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. (holding without elaboration that good faith requires a lack of knowledge). Without 
elaborating on why good faith requires a lack of knowledge, the court proceeded into a discussion of 
whether United Bank could assign the mark and its associated goodwill to the defendant, Harriscorp. 
Id. Under the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, Harriscorp could tack its use of the mark onto that of Unit-
ed to predate Money Store’s registration. See id. (stating that United bank assigned its trademark 
rights to Harriscorp in January 1974); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:5 (explaining that a good faith 
junior user can tack on its use of a mark to that of a predecessor). When a mark is assigned to another 
party, the original owner transfers all rights to the mark, including the mark’s goodwill, to the new 
owner. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:2; see 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (2012) (codifying federal trademark 
assignment). 
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Eight years later, in 1990, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Seventh 
Circuit in its decision in GTE Corporation v. Williams.68 The Tenth Circuit 
held that because a finding of good faith should be based on the junior user’s 
intent, knowledge of the senior user’s prior use of the mark did not by itself 
destroy good faith.69 The junior user, Williams, was aware of the company 
General Telephone and Electronics of California (“GTE”) but did not realize 
that GTE also used the mark “General Telephone.”70 The court held that, alt-
hough knowledge of the use could indicate bad faith, the focus of the court’s 
inquiry should be on the junior user’s intent.71 If junior users did not intend to 
benefit from the senior user’s goodwill, then they still acted in good faith; thus, 
Williams had the right to use the “General Telephone” mark.72 The Tenth Cir-
cuit deferred to the district court’s finding that Williams acted in good faith but 
conceded that instances of junior users adopting a mark in good faith, if they 
had knowledge of the prior use of the mark, are rare.73 The court did not elabo-
rate on its stance regarding the good faith issue.74 
Similarly, in 2001, the Fifth Circuit held in its decision in C.P. Interest, 
Inc. v. California Pools, Inc. that knowledge of a senior user’s prior use of a 
mark is only one factor in considering whether the defendant used the mark in 
good faith.75 Although the junior user, C.P. Interests, did not expressly claim 
that it had no knowledge of California Pools’ prior use of the mark, the court 
nevertheless held, albeit in dicta, that, based on precedent, even if C.P. Inter-
                                                                                                                           
 68 Compare GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (holding that “mere knowledge” is not enough to deter-
mine bad faith), with Money Store, 689 F.2d at 675 (holding that knowledge destroys good faith). 
 69 GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541 (“[M]ere knowledge should not foreclose further inquiry. The 
ultimate focus is on whether the second user had the intent to benefit from the reputation or goodwill 
of the first user.”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. Once a court determines that a party may use a mark concurrently with the owner of a fed-
eral trademark registration in separate geographic areas, the junior user may apply for concurrent 
federal registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052, provided that the party’s use of the mark qualifies it for 
federal registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1052, invalidated by In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 20:81. To qualify for concurrent registration, the parties must be entitled 
to use the mark concurrently and no likelihood of consumer confusion may exist as a result of the 
concurrent use of the trademark. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 20:82; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (allowing 
concurrent federal trademark registration in separate territories under certain circumstances). The 
applicant has the burden to demonstrate that the concurrent use will not result in a likelihood of confu-
sion. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 20:85. 
 73 GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 541. The Tenth Circuit noted that the defendant’s knowledge made the 
good faith claim “improbable.” Id. 
 74 See id. (deferring to the district court’s finding of good faith). The district court held that the 
defendant Williams adopted the mark in good faith because he “did not intend to benefit from GTE’s 
alleged goodwill or reputation,” but also did not elaborate on its reasoning behind this decision. GTE 
Corp. v. Williams, 649 F. Supp. 164, 173 (D. Utah 1986). 
 75 C.P. Interests, 238 F.3d at 700 (“[O]ur past precedent implies . . . that knowledge of use is but 
one factor in a good faith inquiry.”). 
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ests had knowledge of the prior use it would not have been enough to consti-
tute bad faith.76 
In that same year, the Eighth Circuit in its decision in National Associa-
tion for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on 
Aging, Inc., joined the Seventh Circuit in deciding that knowledge of prior use 
of a mark destroys good faith, further cementing the rift between the federal 
circuits.77 The defendant, Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging (“CA”), 
began using the CareLink mark in 1995 in six counties in Arkansas.78 The 
plaintiff, Healthcom, used the same mark in late 1991 or early 1992 in Illinois, 
and did not apply for federal registration until 1999.79 The Eighth Circuit de-
cided, without explaining their rationale, that CA used the CareLink mark in 
good faith without knowledge of Healthcom’s first use.80 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis 
In its analysis of good faith in Stone Creek, the Ninth Circuit reviewed 
past Supreme Court and federal circuit decisions to assess how much weight 
should be placed on a junior user’s knowledge of a senior user’s prior use of a 
mark.81 The court began its analysis by reviewing the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Tea Rose and Rectanus, concluding that the Court’s heavy emphasis 
on the junior user’s lack of knowledge indicated that the Court intended for 
knowledge to be dispositive of good faith.82 The Ninth Circuit supported this 
analysis with a 1988 Supreme Court case, K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., in 
which Justice Brennan posited in his concurrence that good faith requires a 
lack of knowledge.83 The court pointed to additional persuasive authority 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed to its 1954 common law trademark infringement 
decision in El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, which held that, even with knowledge, there was no basis 
for a finding of bad faith on the part of a defendant who used the same name as the plaintiff because 
the plaintiff could not provide evidence that the defendant intended to benefit from the plaintiff’s 
goodwill. C.P. Interests, 238 F.3d at 700; El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 
1954). 
 77 See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, 257 F.3d at 732 (stating that the junior user used the 
mark in good faith and without knowledge of the senior user’s prior use of the mark). 
 78 Id. at 734. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. at 735 (holding without elaboration that CareLink used the mark in good faith and with-
out knowledge of the senior user’s prior use of the mark). 
 81 See Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 437 (citing to the doctrinal Supreme Court cases). 
 82 See id. (concluding that the Supreme Court intended knowledge to be dispositive of good 
faith); see also Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 101, 103 (noting that the junior user used the mark “in good 
faith and without notice of prior use”); Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412 (noting that the junior user used the 
mark in good faith without any knowledge of prior use of the mark). 
 83 Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 437; see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 n.8 
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] firm can develop a trademark that 
is identical to a trademark already in use in a geographically distinct and remote area if the firm is 
unaware of the identity.”). 
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through the holdings of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, agreeing with their 
assessments of the doctrine.84 Finally, the court acknowledged the “design in-
imical” language in Tea Rose but concluded that the Supreme Court’s heavy 
emphasis on knowledge, or lack thereof, made clear that it should be disposi-
tive of good faith.85 
With this doctrinal background established, the court turned to public pol-
icy considerations and identified additional support for strict interpretation of 
good faith.86 The Ninth Circuit decided to bring the Tea Rose-Rectanus doc-
trine in parity with the Lanham Act, stating that actual knowledge, like con-
structive knowledge, should be sufficient to destroy good faith.87 The court 
also held that in light of the underlying trademark policy goal of protecting a 
mark’s goodwill, equating knowledge with bad faith makes the most sense be-
cause, if junior users know they are using a mark that was already in use by 
another party, they implicitly understand that their actions infringe on and 
harm the senior user.88 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED “GOOD FAITH” 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision that knowledge of prior use 
is dispositive of good faith is correct in light of trademark policy goals.89 Be-
cause the Supreme Court never established what constitutes “good faith” in 
applying the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, the element can be and has been 
plausibly interpreted either strictly, as in the Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 430; see Money Store, 689 F.2d at 675 (holding that a junior user 
used the mark in good faith if they did not have knowledge of the senior user’s prior use of the mark); 
Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, 257 F.3d at 732 (holding that the defendant adopted the mark 
in good faith, without knowledge of the senior user’s prior use); supra notes 63–67, 77–80 and ac-
companying text. 
 85 See Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 438 (“But this brief reference to ‘design inimical’ does not 
override the central focus on knowledge; it is not without significance that ‘design inimical’ does not 
appear anywhere else in the opinion.”). The Stone Creek IV court cited to multiple instances in Tea 
Rose and Rectanus in which the Supreme Court closely linked knowledge with good faith. See id. 
(“When describing good faith, the Supreme Court emphasized that the junior user had no awareness of 
the senior user’s use of the mark.”). 
 86 Id. at 438–39. 
 87 Id. at 439; see 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (stating that registration of a mark on the principal register 
serves as constructive notice of the mark’s use). 
 88 Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 439. The Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is an affirmative defense that 
is meant to protect a junior user who “invested time and resources into building a business” with the 
mark in contention. Id. The court reasoned that if a junior user has knowledge of a mark and the asso-
ciated goodwill already built around the mark, then they are not choosing to use that mark in good 
faith because they are aware that they are infringing on another user’s goodwill. Id. In addition to 
benefiting from the mark’s associated goodwill, the junior user is aware that they are also preventing 
the senior user from potentially doing business in the new market where the junior user is using the 
mark. Id. 
 89 See infra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
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of Appeals, or loosely, as in the Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals; as 
such, courts should analyze the policy goals underlying trademark law and ap-
ply the interpretation that best fits these goals.90 
Trademark law serves two major policy aims at tension with one another: 
preventing customer confusion between products and brands, and protecting 
the trademark owner’s goodwill.91 When considering the effects of trademark 
infringement on customer perception, the junior user’s knowledge of a certain 
mark is indicative of both the junior user’s intent and customers’ perceptions.92 
If the junior user knew that a senior business already used the mark, that 
knowledge usually suggests that the senior user’s reputation had already en-
tered the market; thus, any use of a similar mark would be an infringement on 
that senior user’s goodwill, and would be likely to cause confusion between 
the two brands.93 This is because if the junior user was aware of the mark, but 
used it anyway, then the junior user likely intended to prevent the senior user 
from entering the market.94 At the very least, junior users understand that, due 
to their own use of a mark, the senior user would experience difficulty if they 
chose to enter the remote market.95 This knowledge is sufficient to infringe on 
the senior user’s goodwill, and thus knowledge by itself necessarily destroys 
good faith.96 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See infra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. See generally United States Drug Co. v. Theo-
dore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918) (providing no explanation or analysis of “good faith”); Hano-
ver Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916) (providing no explanation or analysis of “good 
faith”). 
 91 See Hanover, 240 U.S. at 414 (stating that trademark rights are for the protection of goodwill); 
Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 823, 825 (2007) (quoting 
Mishakawa Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)) (“Trademark 
law was thus intended to protect the goodwill of the tradesperson and, in turn, protect the consumer 
from being deceived.”). Trademarks distinguish products, influencing the consumer’s decision on 
which product to select. Doellinger, supra, at 825. Trademark owners exploit this brand recognition 
by building a reputation around a certain product in the hopes of inducing more consumers into buy-
ing that product. Id. Trademark laws aim to protect the consumer from being misled when expecting 
to buy from a certain brand associated with a mark, and to protect the seller from losing business and 
tarnishing their reputation because of a similar mark in use by a competitor. Id. 
 92 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:12. If a junior user has knowledge of the mark’s prior use, the 
knowledge could support the presumption that the junior user acted out of bad faith because they 
wanted to cause consumer confusion. Id. 
 93 See id. (“[K]knowledge may be evidence that the senior user’s reputation had in fact entered 
the territory or else how could the junior user have knowledge and its customers did not?”). 
 94 See id. (positing that even if customers in the market did not know of the senior user’s trade-
mark, the junior user must have wanted to prevent the senior user from expanding into that market if 
they had knowledge of the mark and used it anyway). 
 95 See id. (“[A]lthough customers in the territory did not yet now of the senior user’s mark, the 
junior user with knowledge must have intended to foreclose or blockade this territory from the senior 
user’s expansion, as the Court in Tea Rose inferred in its ‘design inimical’ dictum . . . .”). 
 96 See id. (“Proof of the junior user’s knowledge could be viewed as establishing a presumption 
that the junior user must have intended to cause customer confusion and that such confusion did in 
fact occur.”). 
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Allowing knowledge to be one factor in a multi-factor test to determine 
good faith also defeats the purpose of an affirmative defense.97 The Tea Rose-
Rectanus doctrine is an affirmative defense in an action for trademark in-
fringement; the burden is on the defendant to provide evidence of good faith.98 
But if knowledge alone is insufficient to destroy good faith, the plaintiff shoul-
ders the burden to provide evidence of the defendant’s bad faith intent.99 
Finally, knowledge should be dispositive of good faith, rather than indica-
tive of it, to allow parity between federal statutory law and common law.100 
Federal trademark registrations confer constructive notice of the trademark 
owner’s claim to the mark, and no good faith defense exists for a junior user 
who infringed on a federally registered mark.101 If federal defendants cannot 
invoke the defense and continue to use the mark because of this constructive 
notice, state defendants who had actual knowledge of the mark should also be 
enjoined from infringing on the mark and on the senior user’s goodwill.102 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Cf. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that “mere 
knowledge” is not enough to determine bad faith; rather, the focus of a good faith inquiry should be 
whether the junior user intended to benefit off of the senior user’s goodwill), with C.P. Interests, Inc. 
v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that Fifth Circuit precedent required 
knowledge of prior use to be only one factor in determining good faith). An affirmative defense is a 
defense that will negate liability in both civil and criminal cases; the burden is on the defendant to 
prove the defense. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (outlining the rules for affirmative defenses). 
 98 Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc. (Stone Creek IV), 875 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 
2017) (explaining that the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine is separate from a trademark infringement 
claim and is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove). 
 99 See id. (explaining that the defendant must prove the defense). 
 100 See id. at 439 (“The knowledge standard also better comports with the Lanham Act.”). Be-
cause the Lanham Act governs a matter that courts previously decided through common law, Con-
gress must have been familiar with the common law tradition and “intended to retain the substance of 
the common law.” 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 92 (2019); see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:4 (discuss-
ing the legislative history of the Lanham Act). 
 101 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2012). 
 102 See id. (stating that registration of a trademark on the principal register is evidence of an ex-
clusive right to use the trademark); Stone Creek IV, 875 F.3d at 439 (“If constructive notice is suffi-
cient to defeat good faith, it follows that actual notice should be enough too.”). Other Lanham Act 
affirmative defenses include descriptive fair use, nominative fair use, expressive use, genericism, and 
abandonment. 11 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5); see KP Permanent Makeup, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 
543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004) (explaining descriptive fair use); Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. 
Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining genericism); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining nominative fair use); ITC Ltd. v. 
Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining abandonment); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining expressive use). Under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), a defendant 
may assert the defense of descriptive fair use if the owner of a trademark attempts to prevent the de-
fendant from using the terms included in the mark for their ordinary descriptive meaning. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1115(b)(4); see KP Permanent Makeup, 543 U.S. at 124 (holding that, in raising the descriptive fair 
use defense, the defendant does not have the burden of negating likelihood of confusion). Under the 
nominative fair use affirmative defense, the defendant typically argues that it used the plaintiff’s 
trademark to refer to the plaintiff’s goods or services. Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1175–76 (defining the nom-
inative fair use affirmative defense). When parties raise this defense, courts must determine whether 
(1) the product was identifiable without use of the mark; (2) the defendant used the mark more than 
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CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit correctly decided Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian 
Design, Inc. in its interpretation of the Tea Rose-Rectanus “good faith” ele-
ment when it held that a junior user of a mark who has knowledge of a senior 
user’s use cannot assert a good faith defense. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of 
the “good faith” element reinforces trademark law’s ultimate policy goals of 
preventing unfair competition and consumer confusion regarding marks and 
brands, in part by protecting the senior user’s goodwill. The court’s strict inter-
pretation of good faith brings the common law Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine in 
parity with the Lanham Act and appropriately places the burden of proof of 
knowledge, or lack thereof, on the defendant. 
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necessary; or (3) the defendant falsely implied that the trademark owner endorsed them. Id. at 1175–
76. Under the expressive use defense, the defendant typically argues that it used the mark in an ex-
pressive work, raising First Amendment concerns of free expression. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 
(describing the expressive use defense and the First Amendment concerns artistic titles raise). Such 
use of a mark is permissible unless: (1) the mark does not have “artistic relevance to the underlying 
work,” or (2) the use of the mark “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Id. 
Under a genericism defense, the defendant claims that the plaintiff’s mark is generic and federal regis-
tration cannot protect it. Frito-Lay, 786 F.3d at 965. Generic terms are “common descriptive names” 
and by nature are unable to identify a specific source of goods. Id. Under an abandonment defense, the 
defendant claims that the plaintiff stopped using the mark and did not intend to resume using it in the 
foreseeable future, allowing other actors to appropriate the mark. Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 147. The 
defendant must demonstrate: “(1) non-use of the mark by the legal owner, and (2) lack of intent by 
that owner to resume use of the mark in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1064 
(explaining that abandonment is grounds for cancellation of a trademark registration). 
